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Chile, Uruguay', Argentina and the UK, bound closely
together in the nineteenth century by trade and
investment flows, once again share a common fate:
they are the social laboratories for a series of experiments
in economic and social policy. While the economic
policy regimes of these countries have generally been
dubbed 'monetarist', the use of financial controls to
stabilise the price level is merely one instrument (and
by no means the most successfully implemented) in a
set of radical responses to the chronic obstacles to
successful capitalist development in these societies.
This radical response aims to achieve a major change
in the balance of power in these societies and a re-
structuring of their systems of production, in order to
lay the basis for a period of more successful capitalist
development than has been possible in their recent
history. It is, of course, true that, since the war, all four
national economies have periodically experienced the
implementation of stabilisation programmes, designed
to counter inflationary pressures and correct external
disequilibria; furthermore, contractionary fiscal and
monetary policies have been the main response in
most countries to the prolonged crisis of world capitalist
development in the 1970s. Nevertheless, the recent
experience of the Southern Cone of South America
and of the UK is distinct: the duration and intensity
with which harsh, anti-social economic and social
policies have been applied, the explicit desire by
governments to introduce radical transformations of
an enduring character in structures of production, in
attitudes, in behaviour and in social relationships, and
the ruthlessly authoritarian character of the political
regimes in the Southern Cone have few parallels in
modern history.
It would, of course, be wrong to press the individual
national experiences of this counter-revolution in
economic and social policy into too uniform a mould:
differences in initial conditions, due to substantial
differences in historical development, must not be
ignored, while differences between countries in the
relative strength of social groups opposed to government
policy have crucially affected the ability of governments
to press ahead with certain elements in their 'ideal' set
of policy prescriptions.2
The case of Uruguay is flot treated in detail in this article.
2Similar Caution 5 needed in treating different policy elements as
entirely coherent one with another, and in accepting them uncritically
as appropriate to the obstacles to successful capitalist development to
which they are addressed: hut it would he equally wrong to condemn
the 'new orthodoxy' as do some Keynesians) as merely a demented.
half-baked product from the pre-history of the social sciences.
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Nevertheless, the similarities in strategy, ideology and
in policy instruments are striking. Conceptually, it is
possible to distinguish between short-run stabilisation
measures and long-term 'structural' reforms, though
policy-makers frequently treat them as part of a seamless
whole; certainly any distinction is more valid for the
Southern Cone countries, where the military took
power in Argentina in 1976 and in Chile in 1973 in
conditions of hyper-inflation, acute external dis-
equilibrium and extreme social tension. The short-run
stabilisation measures are familiar enough:
substantial real wage cuts for those in employment,
applied to institutionally-determined wage rates and
thence impinging on the overall wage structure;
reductions in the fiscal deficit via expenditure
cuts, principally in subsidies to consumption, in the
public sector wage-bill and in government and public
enterprise investment, and increases in taxation:
inducements to the financial sector ensure that a
higher proportion of the deficit is financed by bond
sales, thereby diminishing the public sector's direct
contribution to monetary expansion;
attempts to control both the demand for and the
supply of credit and attempts from time to time to
make the exchange rate more 'realistic' (although
both in the UK and the Southern Cone exchange
rate policy has also followed the opposite course).
These measures can have rapid, dramatic effects on
the balance of payments: an improvement in 'confidence'
in international financial circles, increased domestic
rates of interest and the unwinding of speculative
positions bring an especially large improvement on
the capital account, while reductions in aggregate
demand (due to wage and fiscal policy) depress domestic
output and the volume of imports. The rate of inflation
remains much less responsive.
The long-term 'structural' reforms centre, firstly, on
the transformation of one of the principal activities
performed by the modern state in the recent history of
these and other industrialised and semi-industrialised
capitalist economies, namely, the support and guidance
given to private sector industrial development. The
pruning of direct and indirect subsidies to the private
sector via cuts in government aid and in subsidised
credit, vigorous disposals of state shareholdings in
private enterprise and the injunction to public enterprises
to charge 'realistic' prices are part of this; the privatisation
of publicly-owned enterprises (in Chile, accompanied
by acute under-valuation of assets) complement this
retrenchment of the state in directly productive
activities.
Correspondingly, the role of market forces is enhanced
as the principal determinant of overall resource
allocation. The aim is to make international relative
prices the standard of reference in resource allocation
and to re-structure the domestic economy in line with
the changing requirements of the international division
of labour. In the Southern Cone, attempts are made
progressively to dismantle industrial tariff protection,
and reform of the foreign exchange regime eliminates
the industrial sector's access to underpriced foreign
exchange (in the UK, the post-war commitment to
increasingly unfettered trade in manufactured goods-
especially within the EECis only modified in the
case of manufactured imports from Japan and the
NICs). However, the use of international relative
prices as the principal standard of reference for resource
allocation is somewhat incomplete: in Chile, due to
export subsidies, in Argentina due to delays in reducing
industrial tariff protection and in the UK because of
the effect of the Common Agricultural Policy on
agricultural trade.3 In the Southern Cone, financial
market 'reform' and de-control of interest rates are
designed to reduce financial market segmentation
and ensure that real interest rates reflect the true
scarcity of savings: interest rate liberalisation, together
with the credit squeeze, raise the real cost of borrowing
to the industrial sector and dramatically improve the
profitability of the financial sector (both in the UK
and the Southern Cone). Price de-control, the removal
of consumption subsidies and of export taxes on
agriculture (of great significance in Argentina) comple-
ment these measures designed to strengthen the role
played by market forces in resource allocation, though
wage policy (discussed below) is an obvious departure
from this principle.
In theory, short- and long-term measures should
complement each other: both the anticipated reduction
in inflation resulting from fiscal and monetary deflation
and the promotion of efficiency and competition
The principal deviation from the use of current international relative
prices as the principal resource allocator concerns the foreign exchange
market, where the real exchange rate in all countries has been subject
to wide variation and for long periods has settled at levels considerably
above what would he consistent with achieving externat equilibrium
at full employment (either of labour or capital( levels of output.
Exchange rate over-valuation has resulted principally from the progressive
integration of domestic and international capital markets, high domestic
interest rates and a relative absence of government controls over
influxes: speculative inflows have been continually rewarded by
exchange revaluation, and governments have welcomed and, by their
inaction, sustained over-valuationdespite widespread excess
capacity as an additional spur to competition and disinflationary
pressure. In the whole battery of measures, exchange rate policy
seems to be the least coherent with the other instruments, Further.
where intervention to prevent further appreciation of the exchange
rate is accompanied by persistent interest rate differentials, continuing
inflows undermine the capacity of the authorities to control the
money supply.
(resulting from the pursuit of laissez-faire) are expected
to achieve the spontaneous re-generation of a vigorous
competitive economy which has been 'suffocated by
all-pervasive state intervention'. Much criticism of
these strategies has focused on the potential contra-
dictions between short- and long-term strategies:
stringent disinflationary measures in an imperfectly
competitive economy produce such large losses in
effective demand, output and profits that spontaneous
private sector recovery is thwarted [Stafford 1981:107-
ill; an alternative formulation is that the social costs
incurred by orthodox, counter-inflationary policies
have been unnecessarily high and result from an
incorrect diagnosis of the inflationary process and a
misunderstanding of the process of adjustment to
lower levels of demand in a modern economy [Diaz-
Alejandro 19801. Such critiques ignore the fact that
apologists for the 'new orthodoxy' see positive virtue
in the costs of deflationary policies: shock treatment
reduces 'organisational slack' in the enterprise sector,
summons up hitherto untapped reserves of increased
productivity and accelerates the death of inefficient
production organisms. Such self-inflicted economic
masochism is lauded as a means to self-rejuvenation of
the private sector.
Deflation and the attempted emasculation of the role
played by the state in contemporary capitalist economic
development (especially industrial development) pose
some of the most difficult questions concerning the
'new orthodoxy'. What are the origins of this shift to
laissez-faire policies? In what ways can this shift to
reliance on market forces be said to address itself to
the problems of the productive sector and lay the basis
for a sustained recovery in capital accumulation?
What evidence is there to suggest that this shift from
interventionist policies is producing structural change
in the right direction? Given the collapse of industrial
profitability (though not in Chile), the bankruptcies of
many industrial enterprises and the elimination of
whole branches of industrial production, who are the
beneficiaries of this strategy?
It is easier to understand the other main thrust of the
new orthodoxy': its anti-labour bias. The aim of
government policy in these countries is to shift the
balance of power between social forces by fundamentally
weakening the bargaining position of the organised
working-class. State policy aims to weaken the ability
of the working-class to pursue and defend its economic
interests, to strengthen the exercise of managerial
authority over the labour process at the work-place, as
well as to curtail the political activities of collective
institutions devoted to the pursuit of the general
interests of the working-class. The disciplinary methods
used are easy to appreciate. Historically high levels of
open unemployment (in Chile peaking at 20 per cent
of the work-force; in the UK and Argentina rising to
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12 per cent and 10 per cent respectively), resulting
from monetary. fiscal and exchange rate policies,
have produced catastrophic declines in industrial
employment. The resulting demoralisation of the work-
force and the weakening of labour resistance to the
rationalisation of production have permitted firms to
prune their work-forces drastically. In the UK, the
prospect of continuing rises in unemployment has
been virtually the only mechanism for inhibiting money
wage increases, and is finally taking its toll on the real
take-home pay of those in employment; by contrast,
in the Southern Cone, government intervention in
wage-setting produced more rapid and dramatic cuts
in real wages. In the Southern Cone, outright repression
of working-class trade union and political leadership,
and revisions in labour legislation designed to de-
politicise trade unions and strip them of traditional
functions, have weakened the leadership of the working-
class movement. In the UK, the trade union leadership
has been weakened politically by being marginalised
from the process of consultation and involvement in
government policy-making, and by incessant political
attacks, although due to divisions in the government
heretofore, it has been deemed unnecessary to make
more than modest changes in trade union legislation.
A chorus of attacks from the mass media and the
effect of falling employment on membership levels
and hence on the financial position of the trade unions
have further weakened them politically.
Common Characteristics
What are the common developments in the Southern
Cone countries and in the UK which could lead
influential sections of the domestic elites in those
countries to support measures which bring about such
a radical change in the role of the state and involve a
major assault on working-class power? Our commentary
considers each country separately, but some striking
similarities are easy to discern.
United Kingdom
The reader hardly needs to be reminded that the
decline in the economic and political power of the
British nation-state has been virtually continuous since
the end of the nineteenth century [Gamble 1981).
Nevertheless, in the post-war years, the economy's
failure to deal with the re-emergence of strong
competitive pressures from other advanced capitalist
countries was somewhat masked because, despite
experiencing relatively lower rates of GDP and
productivity growth compared with other OECD
countries, economic performance was favourable relative
to the country's own past. Such success as was achieved
must be ascribed to the rapid expansion of the world
economy and to the beneficial features of the post-war
political settlement. Economic growth was, however,
subject to a stop-go cycle, attempts to accelerate the
rate of national economic growth being abandoned
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due to growing external disequilibrium in the upswing
of the cycle and the accompanying international financial
crises of sterling.
Britain's lingering world-wide military role undoubtedly
weakened the external payments position. More
importantly, the most influential sectors of British
capitalnamely finance capital and multinational
industrial capital - were committed to increasing
liberalisation of controls on trade and finance, to
which the goal of rapid, domestic growth was
subordinated by governments of both leading parties.
The growing external constraint on growth gradually
gave rise to a situation of virtual economic stagnation
between 1970-79, with only one, short-lived, attempt
to accelerate growth (in 1972-73); with output growing
considerably below potential product, there was a
trend rise in unemployment from 1966 onwards.
While oil wealth has protected the country from the
full consequences of this weak national economic
performance, the UK is now experiencing absolute
economic decline, some of whose consequences in
terms of social and political turmoil have already been
felt. The cause of the unfavourable trend in the
Demonstration against unemployment held in Liverpoo(
November 1980.
current account of the balance of payments lies in the
poor competitive performance of certain sectors of
manufacturing industry, both in the UK's domestic
market and in international markets. The causes of
this weak performance are a matter of considerable
controversy, but, up until the mid-1970s, non-price
factors were of much greater importance than any
fundamental loss of price competitiveness. The low
rate of manufacturing investment was undoubtedly
important in certain sectors, but this has been
compounded by the low productivity of new investment
and the excessive concentration of investment in
certain sectors.
Drnonstra(jon against unernp1ovment held in Liverpoo
Ncwember 1980.
Part of the responsibility for the low productivity of
new investment must lie in the attitudes of both
managers and workers to technical change and the
relative balance of power between them [Kilpatrick
and Lawson 1980!. The defensive strength of the
British trade union movement has rested on its powerful
shop-floor organisation, which was well-suited to exploit
the benefits of the era of full employment [Winchester
1981. Despite enormous shifts in the sectoral distribution
of the labour-force, this defensive strength has expressed
itself in a cautious and often obstructive approach to
technical change, labour re-deployment and the tempo
of work. Managerial accommodation has undoubtedly
been one reaction to this defensive strength: nor can
managerial incompetence, resulting from the persistence
of a highly-stratified social structure and an inappropriate
educational system, be dismissed as a contributory
factor in slow adaptation to technical change.
In an economy suffering from relatively slower growth,
distributional conflict was bound to result in relatively
higher rates of inflation than elsewhere, and the working-
class was well enough organised to resist any prolonged
attempts to cut real wages. Demands for steady (though
comparatively small) increases in private consumption
and the commitment of both main political parties to
increases in the social wage contributed to a tax-wage
spiral and seem to have produced a sharp decline in
profitability in sectors exposed to international
competition [Glyn and Sutcliffe 1972[.
The domestic base of British capital was becoming so
seriously weakened that, in the 1960s, both Labour
and Tory governments attempted to address the
problems of competitiveness and inflationary pressure
by government intervention in industry and the adoption
of wage and price policies. At the political level,
attempts were made to incorporate representatives of
business and labour into the formation of national
economic and social policy.
In the 1960s, measures of industrial intervention included
the promotion of the concentration and rationalisation
of private firms, investment subsidies, and development
of the country's human and physical infrastructure.
But, there were definite limits to state intervention.
For example, measures proposed by the Labour Party
in the mid-1970s, which would have impinged more
seriously on private sector decision-making, such as
Planning Agreements and selective share ownership,
were fiercely resisted, as was the fuller development
of the National Enterprise Board as an instrument for
renovating British manufacturing [see Hodgson 1981
and Coates 19801.
Such measures of industrial intervention as were
undertaken were extremely half-hearted and indirect,
compared with the kind of relationship between the
state and private capital developed in eg France,
Japan and Sweden and numerous underdeveloped
countries. It must be concluded that, while there is a
certain degree of political support for modernising,
interventionist measures in some sectors of British
industry, the politically dominant and more vocal
sectors of British capital resist any significant incursions
by the state into private sector decision-making. This
ideological and political assertion of a hands-off role
for the state is a legacy of the outward-oriented form
of development of British industrial, commercial and
financial capital over the last 200 years and reflects the
contemporary hegemony of the transnational sector
of the economy.
Attempts to moderate money wage increases have
taken both compulsory and voluntary forms. The
most highly developed expression of the latter was the
Social Contract between the trade union leadership
and the 1974-79 Labour government, in which trade
union leaders were responsible for attempts to moderate
pay settlements and, in return, were offered consultation
over many aspects of government policy, certain
extensions of the social wage, legislation extending
the legal immunity of trade unions and government
promises to guide the private sector to utilise the
benefits from pay moderation to modernise British
industry [Tarling and Wilkinson 19781. This
accommodating attitude of the state to British labour
has been the dominant (though not the exclusive)
strand of elite behaviour in the twentieth century, and
has generally been reciprocated by the co-operative
attitude of the trade union leadership. In retrospect,
British corporatism' can be interpreted mainly as a
strategy for moderating money wage demands: it was
singularly unsuccessful at ensuring that the benefits of
wage restraint were transformed into higher investment
and has ultimately proved highly unstable, because of
shop-floor rebellion over wage restraint.
Such state intervention as occurred and the social
contract have been singularly unsuccessful at resolving
the competitiveness-cum-inflation conundrum. Certainly,
in the UK, state intervention has not really been tried
on a sufficiently adequate or imaginative scale, but
this reflects the strength of political opposition to
anything more than the mildest form of indicative
planning. Meanwhile, the net effect of incomes and
prices policies and of the Social Contract was hardly
satisfactory to British capital: the latter served to
strengthen the national political status of the trade
union leadership, brought about further advances in
the 'social wage', did little to reduce the defensive
strength of shop stewards, little to halt the erosion in
profitability and increased the degree of acceptance
of collectivist solutions to social problems. By the late
l970s, Britain's social and political stalemate was
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complete: capital was able to resist further state
intervention, while labour was able to defend its short-
term economic position, without possessing the political
strength to secure industrial modernisation and
employment in the long-run.
The New Orthodoxy
The growing polarisation of political forces and ideas,
in response to the repeated failures of these policies
should come as no surprise to students of Latin American
societies. In the late 1960s, a group within the
Conservative Party began to espouse liberal political
economy, as a conscious break with the consensus on
economic and social policy [Gamble 1974[. Partly,
this was for electoral reasonsthe need to differentiate
the product. Partly, it was ideological, in the sense of a
genuine belief in the recuperative powers of market
forces, and it was congruent with the historical stance
of important segments of British capital, not just of the
petty bourgeoisie. In part, it reflected the view that
state intervention was delaying rather than accelerating
processes of adjustment and laying the basis for 'creeping
socialism', while further failure along these lines brought
forth increasingly radical demands for transformation
of the system. Accommodation with the trade union
leadership had been bought at too high a price and
had even been counter-productive. A retrenchment
of the role of the state in social welfare provision
would be an integral aspect of an attempt to free
resources and new areas of activity for private
accumulation, as well as reduce the tax burden and
inflationary pressure.
The whole analysis required that the re-generation of
British capitalism must perforce rely on private
enterprise's own recuperative powers, while the state
tried to reduce the power of the organised working-
class, rather than adjust to it.
The 'new orthodoxy' was first tried briefly under
Heath 11970-721 and was abandoned as a result of well-
organised trade union opposition. The main lesson
learned by the Riht was that, in addition to political
pressure, economic pressure on the organised labour
movement had to be intensified, but open clashes on
pay policy and on labour legislation were to be avoided.
'Monetarism', public expenditure cuts and de-industrial-
isation are designed to outflank rather than confront
trade unions, by creating slow demoralisation, defeatism
and division. Further, a vigorous attempt is made to
alter the criteria by which the electorate has measured
government performance in the past (eg the government
cannot provide full employment etc etc).
The programme's electoral success can be ascribed to
many factors, including the electorate's ignorance of
the likely consequences of Mrs Thatcher. Also, amongst
working-class electors, at the ideological level the
ground was prepared by the 'soft monetarism' of the
Callaghan-Healey government and the collapse of
accommodation politics. Thatcher also managed to
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exploit resentments over the growing permissiveness
in society iii the 1960s and 1970s. At the election, her
appeal was skilfully populist, whilst in office she has
displayed qualities of strong political leadership.
The 'new orthodoxy' has had its predicted effects on
output and unemployment, interest rates and the
exchange rate. De-industrialisation has accelerated
dramatically, manufacturing output declined by 18.4
per cent in the 18 months following the May 1979
election, and one in six jobs in manufacturing
disappeared, while measured unemployment rose to
12.5 per cent of the labour-force by August 1981 and is
universally expected to surpass three million by the
end of 1981. The principal sources of deflationary
pressure have been
fiscal: despite the recession-induced rise in the
Public Sector Borrowing Requirement, the fiscal
stance of the government is highly deflationary;
monetary: high interest rates made a large
contribution to the recession in 1980 via inventory-
reductions, though monetary targets have generally
not been met; interest rate policy contributed to
exchange over-valuation;
external trade: the underlying (ie at full employ-
ment) trends in imports and exports were exacerbated
due to substantial real exchange rate overvaluation,
though, due to the effects of recession on import
demand and favourable movements in energy trade,
import volume has fallen further than export volume.
[Coutts, Tarling, Ward and Wilkinson 19811.
As in the Latin American cases, the current account
improved dramatically in response to the depressed
level of activity; capital account flows made a negative
contribution, since a massive influx of short-term
capital in response to high interest rates and the
expectation of exchange appreciation has been exceeded
by a huge outflow of portfolio investment, resulting
from the relaxation of controls on outward investment;
the resulting deterioration in the term structure of
overseas assets and liabilities has made the UK's
international financial position more vulnerable than
ever. The lesson from the Southern Cone is that
orthodox measures fail to make an immediate impact
on inflation; in the UK, indirect tax increases, 'realistic'
pricing in the public enterprise sector, increases in
financial costs, energy price rises, declining productivity
and some profit-margin push served initially to increase
the rate of inflation, before it began to decline in the
mid-1980s. Unlike the Southern Cone, in the absence
of pay policy, the real earnings of those in employment
have on average increased since May 1979partly as
a response to pay repression inherited from the previous
government's pay policy; but labour market conditions
and increasing direct taxation are beginning to erode
real take-home pay. It is unlikely, even allowing for
some real wage cuts, given the inevitable depreciation
of sterling and recession-induced cost increases in the
public enterprise sector, that it will be possible to
achieve a sustained reduction in the rate of inflation.
Who Benefits?
The government's attacks on jobs, living-standards
and trade union rights have given rise to relatively
little industrial militancy at the workplace. Trade
union acquiescence and demoralisation have been the
principal response to economic battering and political
pressure [Winchester 1981 j. Apart from the miners,
we are yet to see organised resistance to the huge scale
of redundancies. Nevertheless, as the number of industrial
bankruptcies spirals and industrial and commercial
profits slump, the question inevitably arises: who
benefits from the pursuit of these policies? Certainly,
the financial sector has benefitted hugely from high
interest rates, but though the City is an extremely
influential force at the apex of the British power
structure, these policies are not designed to benefit
any one particular sector of capital exclusively. Despite
their tribulations, there does remain considerable support
for the general thrust of these policies throughout the
boardrooms of British companies, amongst young
managers and many sectors of small business. The
main criticism is that cuts in social expenditures have
been inadequate and that spending on this score has
pushed up interest rates. If anything, business groups
are pushing for an accentuation of the strategybut
with lower social spending, lower wages and more
grants to industry.
The answer to the question, who benefits, must lie in
the proposition that the strategy does respond to the
interests of British capital as a whole, and that the
state is exhibiting genuine autonomy with respect to
the needs of specific sectors. It must be realised that if
unemployment is used to discipline the work-force,
then industrial and commercial profits are bound to
suffer in the short-term: also, deflation is directed
equally against inefficient companies and their managers.
Certainly, the policy must be eliminating a lot of
ineffficient firms, although in bankrupting firms which
are probably efficient in the long-run, the policy lacks
discrimination. Pressures on profit margins due to cost
increases and shrinking markets must have been a
stimulus to greater managerial efficiency, while there
is growing evidence that worker resistance to new
work practices has been weakened by labour market
conditions, the threat of enterprise bankruptcy and by
redundancy payments. Any improvements in efficiency
have not so far been recorded by the standard measures
of labour productivity (output per person employed in
manufacturing fell by 7.7 per cent between the last
quarters of 1979 and 1980), but these statistics may
conceal an underlying improvement in productivity
which will only become apparent when output returns
nearer to full capacity. Equally, there has been a
dramatic decline in investment in plant and machinery
in manufacturing industry (-20 per cent between the
first quarters of 1980 and 1981). But not all sectors are
affected equally by the general contraction in activity:
new and expanding sectors will find conditions on the
supply side more favourable during the recession.
The Future
Traditional working-class institutions have so far failed
to block these policies. The sectional, shop-floor strength
of British trade unionism has proved a severe weakness
under these conditions, and the government has been
able to ignore demonstrations and campaigns mounted
against it by trade unions. Following the radicalisation
of the Left, the Labour Party's opposition to these
policies has been weakened by internal strife,
compounded by the emergence of the Social Democratic
Party. While there are expressions of discontent from
within the business community, pressure from this
direction actually seems likely to push the government
into tougher measures: a more concerted attack on
the legal position of the trade unions, and further
curbs in the welfare state to make room for an 'incentive
budget' for big business.
Will 'Thatcherism' Succeed?
One criticism of these policies of massive deflation is
that they run the risk of throwing the baby (of economic
regeneration) out with the bath-water (of working-
class power). But there are certainly political and
economic limits to the relentless pursuit of deflationary
policies. This strategy for capitalist renewal is probably
a two-stage process. Thatcherism will almost certainly
be a prelude to a more expansionary phase; there will
be no spontaneous revival, as apologists for Thatcherism
insist, but one induced by conventional macro-economic
policy instruments. But if the analysis of low productivity
presented above is correct, we cannot reject out of
hand the possibility that this assault on the British
working-class may succeed in raising productivity and
profitability and inducing more rapid adjustment to
the changing international division of labour. While
this may be termed a 'success' for British capital, these
policies hold out no prospect of achieving full
employment, of expanding the public sector and of
returning to social peace, in the near future.
Argentina
The similarities in post-war developments between
Argentina and Britain are too striking to ignore.4 On
the one hand, within Argentine society, there is a
deep-seated dissatisfaction with the course of national
history over the last few decades. Argentinians can
look back to a 'golden age' of economic development
before 1930, in which expanding exports of temperate
foodstuffs within a framework of close integration
with international flows of trade and capital generated
one of the higher standards-of-living in Latin America;
This discussion draws heavily on the work of Rock 19751 and
Canitrot I 19801.
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despite reasonably successful industrialisation since
1930, Argentina has clearly fallen behind other Latin
American countries in terms of economic power.
Limits to further import-substitution and unfavourable
movements in the country's external terms of trade
(especially during the 1950s) made Argentina, like the
UK, a striking example of balance of payments
constrained economic growth, with growth subject to
a stop-go cycle.
Since the early 1950s, the trade-off in Argentina between
growth, accompanied by an expansion of working-
class consumption, and the balance of payments has
been extremely acute, since wage goods and agricultural
exports are perfect substitutes, while manufacturing
output continues to have a non-negligible import-
content. This trade-off was not so acute under the
favourable external conditions of the immediate post-
war period, rapid economic growth created the material
conditions for a harmonious political alliance between
a local industrial bourgeoisie, benefitting from tariff
protection and the leaders of the organised working-
class, directed against the economic and political
interests of traditional groups linked to the agrarian-
export sector. However, large terms of trade losses in
the early 1950s removed the favourable material basis
for this cross-class alliance and gave rise to prolonged
and intense distributional conflict. Early attempts
(1956-57) to solve the problem at the expense of the
working-class foundered on the resistance of what is
the most homogeneous and highly-organised working-
class in the Third World.5 Hence, prior to 1976,
further attempts to squeeze working-class consumption
were generally of short duration and were rapidly
reversed by policies aimed at conciliation; these provided
but a short-lived spurt to economic growth, giving way
to the well-known ¡MF stabilisation programmes, amid
mounting inflationary pressure and external dis-
equilibrium.
Disunity within the Argentine bourgeoisie must also
be considered. The populist alliance foundered in the
1950s, giving way to an agrarian-industrial alliance,
which sought to resolve the external constraint by
shifting resources to export agriculture at the expense
of the working-class; the failure of the stimulus provided
to agrarian exports, compounded by the destructive
effects of the stabilisation programmes and the rapid
'internationalisation' of the industrial structure split
the Argentine bourgeoisie. This resulted in the
increasingly atomized and fragmented character of
Argentine politics.
'The high degree of organisation of the working-class in Argentina was
due to recognition by Peron of the desire amongst union leaders for
recognition by the state and for political participation, and mass
politicisation resulted from the competition between traditional
groups and the emergent industrial bourgeoisie for political
hegemony.
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Even the united and purposeful dictatorship of Ongania
(1966-70) disintegrated under the impact of urban
insurrection, since the government's economic policies
succeeded once again in uniting the organised working-
class, the 'national bourgeoisie' and the middle-classes.
The initial phase of the short-lived Peronist regime
(1973-75) represented merely the most recent attempt
at social conciliation, in order to isolate the extreme
Left; despite favourable external conditions and wide-
ranging domestic political support, incompetent
economic management generated conditions of
hyperinflation, acute external disequilibrium and social
chaos, in which military intervention was welcomed
by all sectors of the bourgeoisie Idi Tella 1979 j.
The 'New Orthodoxy' in Argentina
The principal aim of Argentina's authoritarian military
regime, installed in 1976, has been to bring about a
major transformation in the economic structure of the
country, with the no less important corollary of destroying
the economic bases of those social groups (namely the
organised working-class and elements of the national
bourgeoisie) hindering this transformation and
responsible for the national populist alliance, which
by the mid-1970s threatened to destroy the prevailing
social system. Thus, long-term economic restructuring
and the attempt. by authoritarian means, to break out
of decades of social stalemate are closely allied goals.
Economic re-structuring involves an attempt to return
Argentina to the role it played in the international
division of labour before 1930. This involves a shift in
income and economic power to the agrarian bourgeoisie;
it also involves partial de-industrialisation via a reduction
in tariff protection, involving a direct assault on the
economic instrument which served as the basis for the
association of interests in the industrial sector between
managers and workers.
The transparently class-based nature of state policies
is clear from the main lines of the 1976 economic
programme: real wage cuts of 40 per cent, devaluation,
the abolition of export taxes on agriculture, the repression
of the labour unions, the purge of labour leaders and
the commitment to tariff liberalisation. Monetarism in
Argentina is, therefore, merely a veil for a major
restructuring of Argentine capitalism and society,
something which previous experience had established
could only be accomplished under an authoritarian
regime.
The implementation of this model has been nothing
like as thorough-going as in Chile. There have been
notable policy changes see Ferrer 1981, and Beccaria
and Carciofi in this Bulletin j and demonstrable
inconsistencies between instruments and policy goals.
Since 1976, there has been no dramatic change in
public expenditure in real terms or in the fiscal burden,
and, at least up to 1978, public enterprise investment
accelerated sharply - partly due to the commitment
of the military to certain key programmes. Tariff
reform has so far mainly affected redundancy in the
tariff, while the planned, final (by 1984) level of
nominal protection is higher than currently is the case
for Chile; meanwhile, the abolition of various stimuli
given to non-traditional manufactured exports, as well
as exchange rate overvaluation have virtually eliminated
non-traditional exports (50 per cent of exports in
1974). Following a large devaluation, the real exchange
rate held roughly constant via a crawling-peg until
June 1978, whereupon a sharp real revaluation (by
roughly 60 per cent between June 1978 and 1980) was
consciously used as an anti-inflationary device. The
net result of these policies and of income adjustment
has left export and import shares in GDP relatively
unchanged; the composition has changed, however,
with exports of agricultural products benefitting from
favourable harvests and cuts in domestic consumption,
and final manufactures increasing as a proportion of
imports. Monetary policy has been relatively passive,
with the growth of the money supply considerably in
excess of GDP at current prices; the monetary
authorities, by minimising controls on foreign financial
inflow and raising the dollar return to placements on
Argentine financial markets by currency revaluation,
have succeeded in controlling only the domestic
contribution to monetary expansion, and between
1976-79,72 per cent of monetary expansion was due to
the surplus on the balance of payments. Certainly, by
comparison with Chile, any financial squeeze was less
pronounced; despite de-control of interest rates, real
rates in domestic currency remained negative for
most of the period since 1976.
As in both Chile and the UK, an examination of the
macro-economic effects of these policy-measures
demonstrates that economic growth has been abandoned
and subordinated to structural reforms. Per capita
GDP has stagnated, and manufacturing output by
1979 was below the level of 1974. Nevertheless, the
investment: GDP ratio rose somewhat, due to the
rapid expansion of public investment.6 Until 1980,
measured rates of open unemployment remained very
low (despite the very substantial contraction of wage
employment in manufacturing and construction), which
can be explained partly by migration and partly by a
rapid growth in self-employment. The principal source
of deflationary pressure has been a cut in private
consumption, due to wage policy, and, more recently,
the effect of currency over-valuation on demand for
home-produced manufactures. Between 1976-78,
inflation control was to some extent subordinated to
the more long-run aim of changing the structure of
Despite more favourable legislation, foreign direct investment has
stagnated, due to widspread spare capacity in the industrial sector
and economic and political uncertainty.
relative prices, though the use of the exchange rate
after 1978 to dampen inflation was a reversal of this
priority. While the rate of inflation fell from hyper-
inflationary levels (3000 per cent in early 1976), by
1980-81 it remained at about 100 per cent per annum.
Real wage cuts, exchange rate overvaluation and
tariff cuts played the principal roles in this, but if old
patterns of income distribution and resource allocation
re-assert themselves, there is likely to be a re-crudescence
of inflationary pressure Malan and Wells 19811.
Certainly, the deterioration since 1979 in the current
account of the balance of payments indicates that
substantial overvaluation of the exchange rate cannot
persist for long.
'The Future is the Past'
The question presents itself: could the primary export
model be socially viable in the long-run, in the sense of
being able to provide employment and rising levels of
consumption for the mass of the Argentine people?
Most critics of the regime have answered unequivocally
in the negative, arguing, for example, that the primary
sector makes an entirely marginal contribution to
total employment (15 per cent) Ferrer 1981]. But this
issue is far from clear. In the medium- to long-run
(policy-makers in the Southern Cone appear to have
their eyes on the twenty-first century), the prospects
for an exporter of temperate foodstuffs, such as
Argentina, must be considered extremely promising.
Income-elasticities for grains and beef are almost
certain to be favourable, and current yields in Argentina's
land-extensive agriculture are considerably below those
of the USlet alone Western Europe. Furthermore,
Argentina is virtually self-sufficient in oil and possesses
considerable unexploited reserves. The direct
employment generated by such agrarian export-led
growth would probably be negligible; however, export
growth on a sufficient scale to reduce the trade constraint
on growth and permit a higher rate of GDP growth
would thereby generate considerable indirect
employment growth; the magnitude of this would
depend of course on the degree of import-penetration
in manufactured goods which accompanied this process.
Under such a strategy, Argentina would benefit from
the possibility of a persistent improve ment in primary
prices relative to those of manufactures. For the full
benefits of such a strategy to be reaped, however,
strong measures of government intervention would be
required to develop the agro-industrial and infrastructual
base of the agrarian economy (as in Canada and the
United States earlier in the century).
The crucial point about the new orthodoxy' in Argentina
is that, many contradictory policies notwithstanding,
it is shifting the focus of activity towards the primary
export sector, in a manner which seems consistent
with the likely evolution of the international division
of labour. The domestic restructuring of Argentine
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Motor car industiy in Rio de Janeiro.
capitalism will be so fraught with social tension that it
can probably only be accomplished through intermittent
authoritarian political regimes, but, in retrospect, the
highly-diversified industrial base established in recent
decades may well appear to have been an entirely
defensible, though perhaps rather short-lived, response
to the historically-specific, unfavourable world economic
conditions of 1930-50.
Complete specialisation in primary commodity
production seems, however, unlikely. Currently, the
viability of this model rests on the ability of the state to
insulate itself, via authoritarian political forms, from
the pressures of the losers in this process of trans-
formation especially in the urban-industrial sector. It
is, however, already clear that, however complete has
been the exclusion of the industrial working-class
from the political process in recent years, the thorough-
going pursuit of a pure laissez-faire model, as in Chile,
has been constrained in Argentina by pressures from
still powerful business groups based on the industrial
sector. Keen as they were to see order restored from
chaos, these groups are probably unwilling to concur
in their own liquidation. Further, however repressive
the authoritarian regime, the past history of both
Argentina and Brazil would indicate that its permanence
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cannot be assured - if only because of tensions within
a military which eventually does not wish to assume
responsibility for all the social costs of domestic
restructuring. In the Argentine case, the harshness of
the current policy regime may be modified and give
way to a second stage, in which de-industrialisation is
less intense, or even reversed.
The Brazilian experience may be instructive in this
respect. Brazilian orthodoxy' in the period 1964-67
was similarly aimed at weakening the economic and
political position of the working-class and of traditional,
national industrial groups, and was predicted by certain
critical social scientists to aim at the re-pastoralisation'
of Brazilian economy and society. However, with
political opposition crushed, the new hegemonic groups
aimed at turning Brazil into a great industrial power,
dominated by multinational and state capital, and
complemented by a rich and diversified agricultural
sector.
It is frequently argued that there are alternative,
milder means of achieving the necessary degree of
domestic restructuring, with lower social costs and
less political resistance. But in all three cases, the crisis
of capitalist development is so chronic that shock
kí
treatment appears necessary to overcome the social
stalemate and the resistance of those sectors of society
standing in the way of this process.
The Case of Chile
Of the three countries considered, Chile experienced
the most savage degree of economic and social
restructuring, but it is a case, which, using the criteria
of success of the 'new orthodoxy', is thought to have
begun to yield positive results. While the magnitude of
the economic disruption apparent even before the
September 1973 coup would have necessitated harsh
stabilisation measures from any political regime, how
is one to account for the simultaneous adoption of an
economic model, which attempts to force the country
back into the role it played in the international division
of labour before 1930, thereby deliberately breaking
with the economic model of the past few decades?
There is widespread agreement that, by the late 1950s,
the attempt to base capitalist development on an
expanding industrial sector had lost much of its earlier
potency for imparting dynamic economic growth.
Even contemporary, 'liberal' policy-makers [Mendez
1979:77] accept, albeit grudgingly, that import-
substituting industrialisation was a legitimate response
to the unfavourable international conditions of the
1930s. However, limits on further reductions in the
import coefficient for manufactures, and sluggish growth
in the import-capacity imposed a severe external
constraint on the feasible rate of growth. The inevitable
economic inefficiencies due to the relatively small
scale of the effective domestic market7 and the high
degree of monopoly in the manufacturing sector,
tended to draw resources from agriculture. Together
with tenurial problems, this created an acute food
supply problem. Inflation was the inevitable concomitant.
The consequence of these 'structural' problems was
that this path of capitalist development lost its capacity
for dynamism and for meeting, at a satisfactory speed,
a rising level of social needs. The tremendous strength
of working-class political and trade union organisation
in Chile meant that these problems were tackled
initially by reformist measures, which respected and
even accentuated the main lines of the economic
model. The reformism of Frei between 1964-70 focused
on agrarian reform, on an extension of state intervention,
on deepening the process of import-substitution and
selective export-promotion and on reducing the drain
to the balance of payments of repatriated profits from
the mining sector. At the political level, reformism
attempted to build-up a constituency around a self-
help strategy amongst groups previously marginal to
'Without subscribing to the 'liberal' critique of tariff-supported industrial-
isation, it must be said that an industrial sector which fails to escape
from infancy is a tremendous drag on income growthespecially if
the international market provides alternative options,
the political process. However, not only did the economic
programme succeed only partially (culminating in
slow growth and spiralling external indebtedness by
the late 1960s), but political mobilisation got out of
control and gave way to growing social unrest. Since
Chilean capitalism failed to respond to reformist
proposals, these in a sense prepared the ground for
more radical solutions. Indeed, the 'structural' problems
of this model were so chronic, that they eventually
risked the demise of the bourgeois social order itself.
After the coup against Allende, something considerably
more radical than minor surgery was perceived as
necessary to make possible the resumption of successful
capitalist development in Chile. Having accepted the
'structuralist' critique for so long offered by the Left,
the Right attempted an anti-democratic solution.
Was it necessary for the regime to incur such huge
social costs (including the scale of political repression
involved) to accomplish this restructuring? In this, the
Chilean military and their economic technocrats may
have learned from the United Party's failure8 [de
Vylder 19761. Gradual social and economic transform-
ation appears impossible, since time is thereby granted
to its opponents to mobilise and eventually thwart the
process. In the initial years of the regime (1973-75), the
prime concern was to eliminate physically the opponents
of the bourgeois social order, and relatively mild
stabilisation policies were used to consolidate the
regime's support amongst the middle-class [Whitehead
1979]. The draconian nature of subsequent, shock
measures (GDP fell by 14.3 per cent in 1975), which
were considerably in excess of the adjustment required
by the international crisis of 1974-75 [Foxley 1981] can
mainly be explained by the need to debilitate those
social groups (including groups within the bourgeoisie),
which stood in the way of the new model.
Policy Measures and Their Outcomes
Chile exhibits in an exaggerated form both the failures
of the monetarist policy regime as short-term stabilisation
programme and some of the inconsistencies between
instruments and objectives, seen elsewhere in the UK
and Argentina. For example, despite massive deflation
(due to cuts in public current and capital spending and
real wage cutsby as much as 50 per cent comparing
1971/72 with 1975), inflation was very slow to react,
'lt is chilling to observe the similarities between the economic
diagnosis and policies and the political strategy of the tIP and those
of the Alternative Economic Strategy of the Labour Left. The UP
also located the source of Chile's problems in the nature of the
country's relations with the international capitalist system; the political
strategy was based on gradually consolidating and expanding popular
support via increasing the degree of resource utilisation in the
economy and expanding public service; the economic strategy also
involved a major expansion of public ownership. lt must be feared
that the same combination of powerful forces both within and
external to the country would destroy the strategy of the Labour Left.
I See Griffith-Jones 1981 on the dangers of'financial irresponsibility'
to which socialist governments are prone.
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taking five years (1973-78) to decline from 606 per
cent to 30 per cent. This reflected declining productivity,
strong pressure from financial costs (including positive
real rates of interest), price 'realism' in the public
sector, exchange depreciation and inflationary
expectations. However, unlike the UK, public spending
cuts were so savage that the fiscal deficit declined
rapidly as a share of GDP (1973-75), despite acutely
depressed levels of activity in the mid-1970s; also the
real wage cut was so considerable, that despite the
recession, the profit share in value added increased.
Despite successfully controlling the public sector's
contribution to credit expansion and attempting to
control the demand for credit, the money supply
became increasingly endogenous as a result of large
additions to the foreign exchange reserves Zahier
19801. Finally, the attempt consciously to use exchange
rate over-valuation to counter inflation, though successful
in that respect, had very perverse side-effects: pre-
announced currency over-valuation gave an additional
impulse to capital inflow (over and above that provided
by domestic-foreign interest rate differentials), which
had an expansionary effect on the money supply; it
also tended to thwart the very process of restructuring
aimed at by the model.
However, in an authoritarian regime, it is possible to
ignore the cumulative losses in output, which an
incorrect diagnosis of inflation implies. On the whole,
the inconsistencies reflect changes in the ranking of
policy objectives: there is also some truth in the
assertion that short-term results are unimportant; it is
the general direction of policies which counts (given
the political framework, of course).
Successful Restructuring?
Orthodox observers proclaim the arrival of a Chilean
'economic miracle' as the fruit of this strategy.
Manufacturing output is now at least 50 per cent
above its 1975 level (though not much higher than
under Allende), real wages of those in employment
appear also to have recovered to the level of 1971 and
open unemployment has fallen since 1975 (though it
stands at twice its historic level). Between 1977-80,
GDP growth averaged eight per cent pa., although it
was only from 1978 onwards that GDP exceeded its
previous peak 1972 level. Recovery has been based on
conventional instruments: relative to the exceptionally
depressed year of 1975, an expansion in fiscal. spending,
a rise in real wages (due to a modification of the wage
regime) and a fall in real rates of interest. This two-
stage sequence of deflation-reflation parallels the rapid
Brazilian recovery in 1967-68 from orthodox stabilisation
and stagflation (even in the fact that expansion was
begun, while inflation was still at relatively high levels);
but such 'economic miracles' are easy to achieve
against a background of huge cumulative losses in
output and widespread spare capacity. Growth can
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only be sustained if there is a recovery in investment -
and in Chile gross fixed investment averaged only 10.5
per cent of GDP between 1975-79, barely covering
replacement requirements.
It is extremely dubious whether restructuring in line
with Chile's current international comparative advantage
in natural resource-based sectors is proceeding
sufficiently rapidly. The net effect of drastic tariff
liberalisation and real exchange depreciation (up to
1978) on domestic manufacturing output was negative
I Vergara 19811; exports of manufactures have however
grown faster than imports. The negative effect of
depressed home demand on domestic manufacturing
was anyway more important than changes in net
trade. As in Brazil at a similar stage in export-promotion,
the new manufactured exports are heavily resource-
based and responded sharply to cuts in domestic
demand and real exchange devaluation before 1977;
but they have since stagnated and even diminished in
real terms due to real exchange appreciation I Ffrench-
Davies 19791.
While exports from the primary sector (timber, fruit
and wood pulp) have grown rapidly, this expansion is
the product of investments undertaken in the 1960s,
with a long gestation period, and not of recent policy
measures. Thus, while Chile's export earnings are now
much less dependent on copper, the danger exists that
due to inadequate investment, export expansion may
run out of steam lFfrench-Davies 19791. In any case,
the current account of the balance of payments is very
precarious; due to import-liberalisation, the current
account deficit relative to GDP in 1978 (6.4 per cent)
was at its highest level in recent history, and has
continued to grow. Any recovery in investment seems
likely to exacerbate this situation, and growth under
the present trade and foreign exchange regime can
only be accomplished by resorting to increasing
indebtedness with the international private capital
market.
Some Conclusions
The 'new orthodoxy' is best interpreted as a conscious
attempt to break out of the previous pattern of capitalist
development in these three countries and the political
and social framework which sustained it. Reformist
attempts to improve the performance of these national
economies foundered on a persistent social stalemate,
while failure gives rise to increasing social tension,
which may ultimately threaten the entire capitalist
social order. Hence, economic restructuring requires
a break with the previous alignment of social forces.
The broad social objectives of the 'new orthodoxy'-
namely the need to destroy the economic basis and
thereby weaken the political strength of sectors which
must lose out in the process of restructuringis as
important as optimising economic management. This
over-riding social objective accounts for the huge and,
in purely technical, economic terms, seemingly
unnecessary scale of the social costs of economic
restructuring.
But the use of draconian measures of economic deflation
and the withdrawal of the state from the stance
adopted in the previous stage of capitalist development
seem likely to be merely the first stage in this process
of economic and social restructuring. Under both
democratic and authoritarian regimes, pressures from
influential economic groups for reflation become
irresistible past a certain point; but, given the changed
balance of social forces, reflected in the political and
economic weakening of the organised working-class,
and some restructuring within the productive system,
the ground is prepared for what may prove to be a
reasonably successful period of capital accumulation.
State intervention of a kind which is politically acceptable
to the business community can also be resumed. Brazil
followed this two-stage process in 19M-74, economic
expansion has been attempted in Chile and reflation in
Argentina may perhaps not be too far off. Thatcherism,
in the UK, has yet to run its full course
however-requiring a further attack on trade union
rights and on the 'social wage' before the first stage is
completed. The question arises: once capital
accumulation is resumed, can the new model be
sufficiently successful to acquire widespread political
legitimation? One answer is provided by Brazil's
experience: however successful such policies may be
in delivering rapid economic growth in a subsequent
phase, the anti-social policies described in this article
leave an enduring heritage of anger and frustration.
Finally, a brief comment on the lessons to be derived
for the UK from Latin American experience: the
political Right recognises the inevitable lack of electoral
success of orthodox policies and begins to hanker for
a more authoritarian framework; if the deterioration
in the underlying economic and social situation under
slightly more 'moderate' policies continues, it produces
growing support for a radical Left solution; if the Left
were ever to gain adequate electoral support for its
programmes, their implementation seems likely to
produce domestic hardships and domestic and
international de-stabilisation sufficient to pave the
way for an authoritarian solution. This suggests the
need for a future Labour government to demonstrate
extreme caution and to engage in only mild reformism,
if the huge defeats in terms of employment and living-
standards suffered in recent years are to be reversed.
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